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SECURING DATA TRANSMISSION IN INTERNET OF THINGS
by
Xuan Zha
The Internet of Things (IoT) is poised to transform our lives and unleash enor-
mous economic benefit. With the rise in the number of connected IoT devices,
the potential vulnerabilities in IoT increase as well. The IoT security faces severe
challenges arising from its specific characteristics. This thesis studies the location
privacy protection and secure data transmission issues in IoT to ensure the data con-
fidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and availability. Markov models are proposed
to analyse the network performance of secure data transmission mechanisms, pro-
viding quantified criteria for selecting appropriate secure transmission protocols in
various network environments. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows,
(1) An anti-pollution source-location privacy scheme is proposed to tackle the
conflict between the source-location protection and authentications. The proposed
protocol consists of key predistribution mechanisms and a homomorphic signature
algorithm, for filtering out polluted and dummy packets at intermediate nodes while
concealing the packet trajectory. The proposed protocol improves the message de-
livery rate and saves energy as compared with previous works.
(2) A probabilistic encrypted data transmission protocol is proposed to transmit
messages in confidentiality in an adaptive manner. It avoids the communication
overhead caused by handshaking in previous data encryption protocols. In addi-
tion, a three-dimensional (3D) Markov model is constructed to analyse the impact
of wireless communication collisions and key predistributions on the performance
of encrypted data transmissions. The analysis and simulation results prove the
accuracy of the 3D Markov model.
(3) An authentication protocol is proposed in opportunistic routing based IoT
networks. In order to improve the authentication e ciency, the proposed protocol
generates authentication information based on the combination of the new message
and previous non-conflict but unauthenticated messages while attempting di↵erent
keys. A new 3D Markov model is designed to accurately capture the interaction pro-
cess among non-coordinated transmissions, key selections and packet lifetime. The
proposed protocol substantially improves the tolerance against changing topologies
and resistance against collusion attacks, as compared to the prior art.
(4) A four-dimensional (4D) Markov model is designed to analyse the impact
of dynamic topology on opportunistic authentication protocols. Three cross-layer
data authentication protocols are proposed with opportunistic authentication and
channel access coupled to di↵erent extent. According to the simulation results, the
4D model is general and accurate. The analysis results prove that opportunistic
data authentication protocols significantly improve the authentication rate, reduce
authentication delay and enhance scalability to dense mobile distributed networks.
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